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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
vague, and therefore may well form the basis for disagreements as to
the result of its application in specific situations. Indeed, the decision
in the instant case might easily have been the same had the new rule been
used by the court. But it would seem that, although the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court is not alone in speaking in terms of "corporate
presence" and "mere solicitation,"-2 7 it would have a fairer and more
effective means of approaching future cases of this type if it employed
the rule and language of the International Shoe case.
JOHN G. GoLmNG.
Sheriffs--Relationship to and Liability for Deputy
The office of deputy sheriff is ". . coeval in point of antiquity
with the sheriff"1 and as such is one of the oldest in the common law
system of jurisprudence. 2 Although some states provide for deputies
sheriff by statute,8 in North Carolina it remains a common law office.
4
The exact relationship between the sheriff and his deputy was not
dearly defined until Styers v. Forsyth County,5 in which Stacy, C. J.
stated:
"Under our law a deputy is authorized to act only in minis-
terial matters, and in respect of these matters he acts as vice
principal or alter ego of the sheriff, for the sheriff 'and his deputy
be, in the contemplation of law, one person.' . . . In short, a
deputy is a lieutenant, the sheriff's right hand man. . . . To call
him an under sheriff . . . is more nearly correct than to style
him an employee." 6
"E.g., Westerdale v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 6 N. J. 571, 80 A. 2d 91 (Sup.
Ct. 1951); Vassallo v. Slomin, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 60, 278 App. Div. 949 (2d Dept.
1951); Allentown Record Co., Inc. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 790 (E. D.
Penn. 1951). See also note 24 supra.
'Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 316, 93 S. E. 850, 853 (1917).
21 ANDERSON ON Sxamirirs §2 (1st ed. 1941) ; Boland, The Ancient Office of
Sheriff, 211 L. T. 177 (1951), ". . . the office of sheriff is, except for kingship,
the oldest office in the country and the only secular office remaining from Saxon
times! '
847 Am. JUR. §154 (1943) ; 1 ANDERSON ON SHERrrs §60 (1st ed. 1941).
'There is no provision for the office of deputy sheriff in either the constitu-
tion (Gowans v. Alamance County, 216 N. C. 107, 3 S. E. 2d 339 (1939)), or
the statutes (Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 286 (1937); Jamesville
& Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891)), except where
modified by public-local law. See note 10 infra.
212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937).
212 N. C. at 564, 194 S. E. 308. The court describes the deputy by four
terms, the total of which would seem to embrace the definition of the office:
". .. he acts as 'vice-principal'" (one to whom the employer has confided the
entire charge of the business or a district branch of it, or one to whom the master
has delegated a duty of his own which is a direct personal and absolute obligation.
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951)) ; "alter ego" ("second self." Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary, 5th ed. (1945)); "a lieutenant" ("one who holds the post
or office of another, in the place and stead of the latter." Black's Law Dictionary
(4th ed., 1951)) ; "the sheriff's right hand man" ("one chiefly relied on." Web-
ster's Collegiate Dictionary (5th ed., 1945.)).
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Prior to that case the deputy had been inaccurately classified as an
"agent," 7 "servant and agent,"" and "employee." 9
Except where regulated by local laws,10 North Carolina follows the
common law in that appointments of deputies sheriff are made by the
sheriff." Despite this, the North Carolina court considers the charge
a public office.' 2 A deputation need not be in writing; it is sufficient
to show that the deputy acted with the consent and privity of the
sheriff.' 3 Other than general constitutional restrictions,' 4 qualifications
for the office seem to be within the discretion of the sheriff "under the
general principles of agency."' Generally, the deputy begins his tenure
upon being deputized and holds the office for the incumbency of the
sheriff unless relieved by the sheriff,16 or county commissioners where
local law empowers them to do so.' 7 A deputy may not be removed
from office by the direct action of the public for he is not amenable to
' Somers v. Commissioners, 123 N. C. 582, 31 S. E. 873 (1898); Brinson v.
Thomas, 55 N. C. 414 (1856) ; Horne v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844).
' jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891);
Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860).
' Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937): "... in
some of the cases a deputy is loosely spoken of as an employee of the sheriff. .. "
10 Some local laws permit county commissioners to appoint deputies sheriff,
e.g., N. C. Public-Local Laws 1931 Ch. 128; others authorize appointment by the
sheriff within the discretion of the county commissioners, e.g., N. C. Public-Local
Laws 1935 Ch. 576. In at least one instance, N. C. Public-Local Laws 1937 Ch.
382, a deputy sheriff was appointed by the General Assembly.
" Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 754 (1944) ; Jamesville
& Washington RR. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 135 S. E. 698 (1891) ; Willis v. Melvin,
53 N. C. 62 (1860).
" Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 754 (1944) ; Blake v.
Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942) ; Gowens v. Alamance County, 216
N. C. 107, 3 S. E. 2d 339 (1939) ; Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194
S. E. 305 (1937); Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850
(1917); State v. Alston, 127 N. C. 518, 37 S. E. 137 (1900). But cf. Potts v.
United Supply Co., 222 N. C. 176, 22 S. E. 2d 255 (1942). The court -held that
there were cases or dicta which would suggest that a deputy is not a public officer
within the meaning of N. C. GEN. STAr. §1-77 (1943), citing Blake v. Allen, 221
N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942) ; Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194
S. E. 305 (1937) ; and Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937).
" jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891);
Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860); Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844);
Buchanan v. McIntosh, 24 N. C. 52 (1841).
N. C. CoNsT., Art. VI, §8; Art. XIV, §2. These restrictions apply to the
qualifications for all public offices within the state.
" Jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891).
In holding the appointment of an infant as deputy sheriff valid the court said:
"... the sheriff is civilly responsible for the unlawful acts of his deputy ...he
selects and appoints his agents at his own hazard...."
1 Somers v. Commissioners, 123 N. C. 582, 31 S. E. 873 (1898) (court held
that a deputy's tenure terminated upon the sheriff's being declared insane) ; Willis
v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860).
"' N. C. Public-Local Laws 1929 Ch. 451. Where the sheriff has the tax list
in his hands when his tenure of office expires, any resistance to his deputy who
thereafter attempts to collect the taxes is considered resistance to an officer. State
v. Alston, 127 N. C. 518, 37 S. E. 137 (1900). However, collecting taxes is
considered a mere incident to the office and does not terminate with the other
duties. State v. Alston, supra; Perry v. Campbell, 63 N. C. 257 (1869).
1952]
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them for his misfeasance.18
Deputies are divided into two classifications, general and special.
The general deputy is an officer who has the authority to execute all of
the ordinary ministerial duties of the sheriff. The special deputy has
been defined as an officer of specific limited duties, usually employed to
execute a particular writ on a particular occasion.19 This definition
does not seem adequate in the light of present day practices. It would
perhaps be better to expand the definition to include officers who per-
form particular duties as well as execute particular writs. 20 Although
the acts of the deputy are representative and are done in the name of
the sheriff,21 the sheriff may not delegate a part of the authority of his
office to his deputy and thus relieve himself of obligation, for he alone
is responsible for the incumbencies of his office.22 Nor may a general
or special deputy delegate his duty to another unless authorized to do
so by the sheriff,23 though a general deputy has it within his power as
the general "acting arm" of the sheriff to appoint a special deputy.
2 4
If the law requires that an act be done by the "sheriff of the county,"
if ministerial, it may be performed by his deputy since the direction
refers to the office and not the man.
25
The deputy, like the sheriff, is territorially confined to the bound-
aries of his county.26 At common law the only exception to this was
where the sheriff or his deputy was in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon in
which case the boundaries could be crossed. North Carolina has lim-
ited this "extra-territorial" jurisdiction to bonded deputies,27 but as
to them has expanded it to include violators of the state's prohibition
laws. 28  In some few cases local laws permit deputies to pass from
"2 Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860).
"0 Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937) ; Lanier v. Town of
Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917).
20 See note 48 infra.
"Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942) ; Styers v. Forsyth
County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937) ; Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472,
193 S. E. 826 (1937) ; Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850(1917).(Laer v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917) ; Cansler
v. Penland, 125 N. C. 578, 34 S. E. 683 (1899). The duties and authority of the
sheriff are prescribed and directed by law and are not within his discretion. How-
ever, the sheriff does have the administration of his deputies within his discretion.
Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942); Borders v. Cline, 212
N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937). Although the sheriff has judicial as well as
ministerial duties, the deputy may act for him only in the latter. Blake v. Allen,
spra; Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937) ; Borders v.
Cline, supra; Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917)
Yeargin v. Siler, 83 N. C: 348 (1880).
2 Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942).
" 1 ANDERSON ON SHERIFFS §74 (Ist ed. 1941).
"5Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917).
Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942).
27N. C. GEr. STAT. §15-42 (1943).'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §18-45(0) (1943).
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one county into another.-
Generally, a sheriff is held liable for the wrongful acts or omissions
of his deputy committed under color of office. 30 The basis for this
responsibility is the principle that "the hand that does or procures the
act [to be done] is liable." 3' Thus, the receipt of claims by the deputy
is regarded as the same as receipt by the sheriff ;32 a demand on a de-
faulting deputy for money collected is equivalent to a demand on his
superior;33 and admissions or declarations of a deputy may be used as
evidence against the sheriff.3 4 The deputy, on the other hand, is liable
to the sheriff for his misfeasance of office, and where he gives a bond
to the sheriff for the faithful discharge of his duties, it is for the sheriff's
protection and not the public at large.35 At common law the sheriff
alone could be sued by the injured party, and he in turn would recover
from his deputy,3 6 whereas today the suit may be against the deputy
as well as the sheriff.
37
It is a fairly common practice in North Carolina for a deputy sheriff
to be engaged in private employment while also serving as deputy.38 In
29 N. C. Public-Local Laws 1941 Ch. 23.
" Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, - S. E. 2d - (1952); Towe v. Yancey
County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 574 (1944) ; Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445,
19 S. E. 2d 871 (1942) ; Davis v. Moore, 215 N. C. 449, 2 S. E. 2d 366 (1939) ;
Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937) ; Borders v. Cline,
212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937); Jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher,
109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1898) ; McClean v. Buchanan, 53 N. C. 444 (1862) ;
Martin v. Martin, 47 N. C. 285 (1855) ; Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844) ;
Satterwhite v. Carson, 25 N. C. 549 (1843); Spencer v. Moore, 19 N. C. 264
(1837). As to the extent of the liability of the sureties in the sheriff's bond, the
present view imposes liability for any wrong committed under color of office,
whether negligent or willfull. Dunn v. Swainson, 217 N. C. 279, 7 S. E. 2d 563
(1940) ; Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N. C. 270, 4 S. E. 2d 611 (1939). Previously,
the sureties had been held responsible for the performance of only those duties
incumbent upon the sheriff by virtue of his office. For a discussion of the old view
see 12 N. C. L. REv. 394 (1934).
Generally, a sheriff may not be held criminally liable for the act of his deputy,
though when a sheriff made a false return on a writ based entirely on the false
return of his deputy, be was held liable to a criminal charge. State v. Johnson,
2 N. C. 293 (1796).
" Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937).
"2 State v. McGhee, 29 N. C. 377 (1847) ; Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844);
Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1844) ; State v. Roane, 24 N. C. 144 (1841).
Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1844).
"Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844).
"Blalock v. Peake, 56 N. C. 324 (1857); Brinson v. Thomas, 55 N. C. 414
(1856) ; Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1884). If the sheriff is held liable for
the acts of his deputy and his sureties are compelled to indemnify, the sureties,
under the principles of subrogation, may bring action against the sureties of the,
deputy to recover sums paid out.
" Brinson v. Thomas, 55 N. C. 414 (1856); Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62
(1860); Martin v. Martin, 47 N. C. 285 (1855); Hampton v. Brown, 35 N. C.
18 (1851) ; Tarkington v. Harsell, 27 N. C. 359 (1845) (where a deputy prom-
ised to make good a default the sheriff was not held liable) ; Lyle v. Wilson, 26
N. C. 227 (1844).
"' Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, - S. E. 2d - (1951) ; Davis v. Moore, 215
N. C. 449, 2 S. E. 2d 366 (1939).
" Such functions include serving as special town policeman, peace officers in
and around amusement centers, and as guards and night watchmen for municipal,
1952l
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such cases the question of liability for the wrongful acts of the deputy
takes on dual aspects: is the sheriff responsible, the private employer
responsible, or are they jointly liable? In most cases the question would
seem to depend upon whose employ the deputy was in at the time the
wrong was committed, the issue being one for the jury.30 The diffi-
culty comes where it is found that the deputy was in the employ of
both the sheriff and the private employer. Should the liability be joint,
and if so, should it also be several? Apparently, North Carolina has
not passed upon the point; but since generally the deputy is in the
relationship of principal and agent with his private employer, 40 and in a
comparable relationship with the sheriff,41 the general rules of agency
should be followed.
North Carolina needs to clarify its position as to the liability of
the sheriff for his deputy and also to provide answers to other ques-
tions involving the office. If the deputy sheriff is a public officer, does
he come within the statutory requirements of public officers respecting
dual office holding, oath of office, official bond and similar require-
ments?42 Is on-the-spot deputization still possible or is it necessary
that there be a ceremony and written appointment? Can a sheriff limit
his liability for the wrongs of his special deputies by specific instruc-
tions? Are all deputies actually within the existing classifications of
general and special deputies?
Clearly, there is a need in North Carolina for legislation to provide
for the office of deputy sheriff and to define its limits and obligations.
In addition, the varied and often conflicting local provisions pertaining
to this office serve no apparent purpose, and should be eliminated and
replaced by uniform requirements.
JAMEs R. TRoTTER, JR.
industrial and other locations. See e.g., Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 331, - S. E.
2d - (1952).
" Where a special police officer, appointed by the governor as a railroad guard,
but paid by the railroad, killed another in the exercise of his duties, the court
held that if the guard was engaged in the performance of a duty owed his em-
ployer by reason of his employment, then the railroad would be liable; otherwise,
he would be held in his capacity as a public officer. The question was one of fact
for the jury. Tate v. Southern R.R., 205 N. C. 51, 169 S. E. 816 (1933). In a
similar case in which the question was one of joinder of parties, the court held that
it was proper to join the private employers with the sheriff, the deputy and their
sureties, on the premise that if the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom
he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants to determine which
is liable, the question of whether the deputy was acting as a servant or public
officer again being one for the jury. Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, - S. E. 2d -(1952).(5 It is conceivable that the deputy could be an independent contractor. In such
a case the liability would be different, depending upon the circumstances. Such a
relationship is beyond the scope of this note.
"1 While the deputy is not an agent of the sheriff, the relationship is closely
akin to agency, and in many cases the liability of the sheriff for his deputy has
been based on agency. Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305
(1937).
'2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §128-1 through §128-41 (1943).
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